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GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN INSURANCE
CONTRACTS: GRUENBERG v. AETNA
INSURANCE CO.
A primary right of a purchaser of a contract of insurance is the
right to payment when a loss or other event signals the insurer's liability
within the coverage of the policy.1 Traditionally this right has been
enforceable purely as a contract action. In the recent decision of Gru-
enberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,2 the California Supreme Court held
that an insurer's failure to meet its duty to pay the claims of its insured
in good faith constitutes a tortious breach of contract.3 Such character-
ization places upon an insurer an implied-in-law duty to fulfill its basic
commitment under its contract of insurance, independent of its contrac-
tual obligations. 4 When an insurer fails to meet this basic commitment,
it will be liable in tort for breach of its implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing.5
In so holding the court expands the duty of good faith and fair
dealing explained in the landmark decision of Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co.6 The Gruenberg court includes within this duty not only
the duty to accept reasonable settlement offers of third party claimants
but also the claims of the insured. Failure to meet this duty will expose
the insurer to liability for all proximately caused damages, as well as
punitive damages in the appropriate case. In its holding the court up-
held the recent court of appeals case of Fletcher v. Western National
Life Insurance Co. 7 and broke new ground in the area of an insurer's
liability for breach of its contract of insurance.
This note will review the duty of good faith and fair dealing, both
historically and in the context of the Gruenberg expansion. It will fur-
ther discuss the necessity of the Gruenberg decision, and explore what
action on the part of an insurer will expose it to liability for breach
of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.
1. Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 13
VAND. L. REV. 837 (1960).
2. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
3. Id. at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
4. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
5. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
6. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
7. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
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Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.
Early on the morning of November 9, 1969, Jerome Gruenberg
was notified that his cocktail lounge and restaurant had been destroyed
by fire. Soon after he had arrived at the scene of the fire, Gruenberg
became embroiled in an argument with a member of the arson detail
and was arrested. The following day, after being informed of the fire,
the defendant insurers8 sent an adjuster to investigate the fire and in-
spect the premises. During his investigation and with knowledge or
reason to know that Gruenberg was insured for an aggregate sum of
only $35,000,1 the adjuster told an arson investigator that Gruenberg
was carrying excessive fire insurance on the business. Three days later
Gruenberg was charged with arson and a preliminary hearing was set
for mid-January. Shortly thereafter, the insurers demanded that the
plaintiff appear for an examination under oath and give his account
of the fire pursuant to the "cooperation and notice" clause of the con-
tract as required by the California Insurance Code.' ° On advice of
counsel, Gruenberg refused the demand and requested that the exami-
nation be delayed "until after a final disposition of the criminal pro-
ceedings."'" The defendants warned Gruenberg that failure to appear
would be considered a breach of the contract and that liability would
be denied.
At the scheduled preliminary hearing the adjuster stated his belief
that Gruenberg had excessive coverage for his business. The magis-
trate dismissed the charges for lack of probable cause and Gruenberg
notified the defendants that he was willing to appear for an exami-
nation. The insurers refused plaintiff's request for an examination, de-
nied liability, and refused to pay.
In his complaint, Gruenberg alleged in essence that the defend-
8. The defendant insurers were: Aetna Insurance Company, Yosemite Insur-
ance Company, and American Home Assurance Company. Other defendants were:
P.E. Brown & Company (the investigation firm hired by the insurers); Carl H.
Busching (a claims adjuster for Brown); Cummins, White, Breidenbach & Alphson
(law firm retained by the insurers); and Donald Ricketts (an attorney-employee of
the law firm). Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 569-70 n.1, 510 P.2d
1032, 1034 n.1, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 482 n.1 (1973).
9. Gruenberg had recently purchased new policies and cancelled others. The
net result was a substantial reduction in the total amount of insurance. Brief for
appellant at 27, Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1972); see Gruen-
berg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887, 889 (1972).
10. CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1972). "The insured, as often as may be
reasonably required, shall exhibit to any person designated by this company all that
remains of any property herein described, and submit to examinations under oath by
any person named by this company, and subscribe the same; and, as often as may be
reasonably required, shall produce for examination all books of account, bills, invoices
and other vouchers ....
11. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887, 889 (1972).
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ants willfully and maliciously entered into a scheme to deprive him of
the benefits of the several insurance policies by falsely implying that
he had a motive to commit arson and encouraging criminal charges
to be filed against him. The plaintiff further alleged that the defend-
ants, knowing the plaintiff would not appear during the pendency
of the criminal charges, used his failure to appear as a pretense for
denying liability under the policies. The lower court sustained the gen-
eral demurrers of all defendants "under the compulsion 12 of Hickman
v. London Assurance Corp.,13 which held that constitutional immunity
has no application in a private contract. The court of appeal overruled
the demurrers of the defendant insurers but affirmed those of all other
defendants, holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for
breach of contract but was insufficient to support an action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress."4
While upholding the result of the court of appeal, the Supreme
Court of California overruled the demurrers of the insurers by holding
that the complaint stated a cause of action for tortious breach of con-
tract. The court explained that there is an implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing arising from every contract of insurance. This duty
is independent, absolute and not conditioned upon the other party's per-
formance of his contractual duties. The law imposes upon the insurer
the duty "to act in good faith and fairly in handling the claim of an
insured, namely a duty not to withhold unreasonably payments due
under a policy." 5 When an insurer fails to meet this duty, it will be
liable in tort, notwithstanding that such action may also constitute a
breach of contract.' 6
12. Id. at 890.
13. 184 Cal. 524, 195 P. 45 (1920). In Hickman the insured suffered a loss by
fire and refused to appear for an examination under oath as required by the contract,
because of a pending criminal charge of arson. Thereafter the insurer denied liability
under the policy and the insured brought suit. The court held that an insured under a
fire insurance policy containing a requirement that he submit to an examination under
oath concerning matters within coverage of the policy cannot justify a refusal to
submit to such examination on the ground of a privilege of self-incrimination. The
constitutional immunity has no application to a private examination arising out of a
private contractual relationship. Id. at 532-33, 195 P. at 49. It should be further noted
that Hickman dicta removed Gruenberg from the Hickman rule. Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887, 890 n.3. "It may be that, if [Hickman] . . . had made
an offer [to submit to an examination] after the criminal charge against him had been
dismissed... and such offer had been refused, his default would have been removed."
Hickman v. London Assur. Corp., 184 Cal. 524, 533-34, 195 P. 45, 49 (1920).
14. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887, 891 (1972).
15. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
16. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486, quoting Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970).
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Background: Origins of the Tort Theory
The special nature of an insurance contract has long been recog-
nized by the judiciary. 17 A nineteenth century court reasoned that be-
cause of the particular nature of the insurance contract, the insured-
insurer relationship was built upon mutual confidence. It was rea-
soned that parties to a contract of insurance should deal with each other
in a spirit of good faith and fair dealing, and this spirit should form
a part of every insurance contract. 8
The first full judicial recognition of an implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing arose in situations where liability insurers failed to
settle third party claims against their clients and thereby exposed the
insured to a judgment in excess of the policy limits.' 9 In Hilker v.
Western Automobile Insurance Co.,20 the insurer refused a reasonable
settlement offer by the claimant, resulting in a judgment against the
insured over twice the policy limits. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
pointed out that the rights of an insured go deeper than the mere sur-
face of the written contract;2' an insurer who in bad faith fails to settle
a claim within policy limits will be liable for the full amount of the
judgment.22  The court based its rationale partially upon the conflict
of interest between the insurer and the insured. It recognized that be-
cause of this conflict the conduct of the insurer must be subjected to
close scrutiny to determine whether it has acted in good faith in con-
sidering its insured's interests.23
Using Hilker as a foundation, the California Supreme Court in
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. 4 held that in every
contract of insurance there is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing that neither party will do anything to injure the rights
of the other under the agreement. Regardless of whether it is imposed
17. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 74 (2d ed. 1930). See also
Manhattan Fire Ins. Co. v. Weill & Ullman, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 389, 26 Am. R. 364
(1877).
18. Germania Ins. Co. v. Rudwig, 80 Ky. 223, 235 (1882).
19. Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708
(1924); Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914). For
earlier decisions reaching the opposite result, see Kleinschmidt v. Farmers Mut. Hail
Ins. Ass'n, 101 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1939); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899); St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employer's
Indem. Corp., 224 Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W.2d 215 (1930); McDonald v. Royal Indem.
Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 308, 162 A. 620 (1932); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236
N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923); C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914).
20. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
21. Id. at 4, 231 N.W. at 258.
22. Id. at 5, 231 N.W. at 258-59.
23. Id. at 8, 231 N.W. at 260.
24. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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by the express terms of the contract, this implied covenant requires an
insurer to settle a claim in an appropriate case. The court reasoned
that, when considering a settlement, the insurer must give at least equal
weight to the interests of the insured. 25 It further stated:
When there is a great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits
so that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is
a settlement which can be made within those limits, a considera-
tion in good faith of the insured's interest requires the insurer to
settle the claim. Its unwarranted refusal to do so constitutes a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 26
Although Comunale was first interpreted as involving solely a con-
tract action,27 the landmark decision of Crisci v. Security Insurance
Co.2 s characterized the breach of duty to accept reasonable settlements
as sounding in tort as well as contract. In redefining the Comunale
approach, the court held that the test for determining whether an in-
surer had considered the interests of the insured was "whether a pru-
dent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the settlement
offer."20  The court also expanded the damages recoverable from an
insurer when he fails to make good faith settlement to include damages
for proximately caused emotional distress.
The extension was based on two grounds. First, one of the con-
siderations in the purchase of insurance is the peace of mind it will
provide in event of a loss. Secondly, when substantial damages arise
apart from that caused by the mental distress, there is no reason to
distinguish between mental distress accompanying personal injury and
that accompanying an invasion of property rights.30 The court found
that when an insurer's tortious conduct, in failing to meet its duty of
good faith and fair dealing, caused the insured to lose his property and
suffer mental distress, the insurer will be liable for all such damages."'
Relying heavily on the Crisci rationale, the California court of ap-
peal in Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.32 recognized that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing was not limited to a bad faith
failure to settle a third party claim, but also encompassed tortious con-
duct by an insurer when handling a claim by its insured. Fletcher
severely injured his back in the course of his employment and began
receiving payments under a disability insurance policy he had purchased
25. Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201, citing Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156-Cal.
App. 2d 652, 659,-320 P.2d 140, 146 (1958).
26. 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
27. Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964).
28. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
29. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
30. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
31. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
32. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
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from Western National. The agreement provided that Fletcher would
receive $150 per month for thirty years under the injury provision of
the policy. Almost immediately Western National attempted to mini-
mize its liability under the policy by falsely accusing Fletcher of ma-
terial misrepresentation in filling out his application and claiming that
he should be paid under the sickness provisions of the policy which
allowed payment for a maximum of two years. When Western Na-
tional finally threatened to deny liability altogether, Fletcher brought
suit principally under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Although the court held that the defendant insurer's conduct ex-
posed it to liability on this theory, it further held that such conduct
was also a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.33 This
implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing imposes upon the
insurer a duty not to withhold or threaten to withhold, maliciously and
without probable cause, payments due its insured under a policy. 34 Such
tortious conduct will expose the insurer to damages for property loss,
mental suffering and, in the proper case, punitive damages.3 5
Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.:
Emotional Distress or Good Faith and Fair Dealing
While Fletcher appeared to give a new remedy to a beleaguered
insured, the court's use of an alternative holding clouded interpretation
of the court's extension of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. First,
Fletcher may be interpreted as a cause of action fundamentally for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. Second, the court left confu-
sion as to what conduct was necessary by an insurer to breach its
duty of good faith and fair dealing.
With respect to the first problem, courts have viewed Fletcher as
being decided solely upon the theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 36  The Gruenberg court lays this problem to rest by
squarely holding that when an insurer unreasonably and in bad faith
withholds payments due to its insured it has breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing. By so holding, the court establishes the
Fletcher alternative holding as a valid cause of action; the good faith
and fair dealing theory achieves the status of an independent cause of
action.
33. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
34. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
35. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
36. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (1972); Gruen-
berg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1972).
37. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1973).
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The second problem with Fletcher is whether the new duty re-
quires the same outrageous conduct necessary to establish the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.38 The tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is intended primarily to protect the "in-
vasions of the personal interest in emotional tranquility, not economic
losses, unless . . . the economic losses result from the intentionally
caused emotional distress." 39  Because of the indefinite consequences
of the invasions of a person's emotional tranquility and the traditional
argument against opening the door to fictitious and trivial claims,
40
courts have limited recovery to outrageous action which leads to severe
emotional distress. 41  The arguments for the necessity of outrageous
conduct break down when emotional distress is but a result of an inva-
sion of other personal and property interests.42
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is not subject to such un-
definable limits. This duty has as its primary target the protection of
property interests and economic losses which flow from an insurer's
tortious breach of his contract.43 These property losses are indefinable
or intangible. Such losses include: loss of earnings, eventual business
failure, inability to pay creditors, legal expenses incurred in defense of
creditor suits,4 4 as well as the excess judgments involved in the Crisci
line of cases. While such loss quite naturally may result in significant
mental distress, 45 it also may not. It can be argued that, simply be-
cause the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing involves
damages in the form of emotional distress, it therefore requires outra-
geous conduct; however, this argument negates the basis of the Crisci
holding.46 Gruenberg rejects any such theory, and finds that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing is a totally distinct theory from one based
upon the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 41  When an in-
38. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 337-38, 240
P.2d 282, 285-86 (1952).
39. Fletcher v. Western Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 402, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 94 (1970).
40. W. PRossER, Lw oF TORTS § 12, at 51-52 (4th ed. 1971).
41. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 394, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 88 (1970).
42. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 19 (1967).
43. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401-02, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 93-94 (1970).
44. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 580, 510 P.2d 1032,
1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489-90 (1973).
45. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 19 (1967).
46. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
47. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., .9 Cal. 3d 566, 580, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041-42;
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489-90 (1973).
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sured incurs damages for loss of his property by the insurer's breach
of duty, the inclusion of damages for mental suffering does not change
the essential nature of his cause of action. While the insurer's action
in Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.4" and in
Fletcher, as well as the alleged action in Gruenberg, were unquestion-
ably outrageous, the court's dependence upon Crisci negates any con-
clusion that the insurer's action must be outrageous. The basic thrust
of Crisci is an absence of good faith and fair dealing on the part of
the insurer when considering the interests of its insured. There is no
necessity to show positive or actual dishonesty, fraud or concealment. 49
While such a showing is highly relevant in determining whether an in-
surer has considered in good faith its insured's interests in refusing
a reasonable settlement offer, it is not an element within that duty."0
Gruenberg, while bringing the insurer's unreasonable and bad faith
withholding of payments due its insured within the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, does not require a different standard. As the court
stated:
It is manifest that a common legal principle underlies all of the
foregoing decisions; namely, that in every insurance contract there
is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The duty
to so act is imminent in the contract whether the company is at-
tending to the claims of third persons against the insured or the
claims of the insured itself. Accordingly, when the insurer unrea-
sonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its
insured, it is subject to liability in tort.51
Therefore, when an insurer breaches of his duty of good faith and fair
dealing, and causes his insured to lose property and suffer mental dis-
tress, the insurer will be held liable for both the pecuniary loss and
the proximately caused mental suffering,"2 regardless of whether the
breach was of such severity as to be considered outrageous.
48. 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972). In Richardson, the in-
surer took the position that policy claims under the uninsured motorist provisions of
the insurance policies shall be paid "only as a last resort." The insurer thereafter
used deliberate, willful and bad faith methods to settle at a lower amount than reason-
ably due under the policy. It should be further noted that Richardson declared that to
support an award for damages for emotional distress arising from a breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, there must be evidence of severe emotional distress.
Id. at 241, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 553. The Gruenberg court expressly overrules this hold-
ing. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 580-81 n.10, 510 P.2d 1032, 1042
n.10, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 490 n.10 (1973).
49. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
50. Id.
51. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973).
52. Id. at 579-80, 510 P.2d at 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
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Good Faith and Fair Dealing Dictated by
Insured-Insurer Relationship
The insured-insurer relationship is "special ' 53 and there are special
duties attached to the relationship which must be noted. Moreover,
the Fletcher-Gruenberg extension of the Crisci concept of good faith
and fair dealing was one of necessity, dictated by the economic, social,
and legal realities which attend the relationship.
54
Economic
Traditionally, legal theory envisions parties to a contract bargain-
ing for their own economic end from presumably equal positions.55
While this equality of bargaining power may be true in large mercantile
insurance contracts, it is not the case in the bulk of insurance contracts
today.5" A severe inequality of bargaining power between the insurer
and the insured is caused by many factors: the inability of most in-
sureds to understand the technical nature of an insurance contract,
the various conditions and governmental regulations afforded such con-
tracts, the economic necessity of mass production and sales of contracts
of insurance, and the characteristic disparity in financial backing be-
tween the parties. 57  The end product is a contract of adhesion.5   Ed-
win W. Patterson's original concept of this relationship still stands to-
day: "The contract is drawn up by the insurer and the insured, who
merely 'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its terms." 59  The only
true choice given the insured is to do without and face the very thing
he has contracted against: economic ruin.
Social
It has been recognized that the insurance business is affected
with the public interest. 60 Its relation to the insured and to society
is not in the nature of a normal business, but rather it is quasi-public
53. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
54. Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
55. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1305, 1307 (1968).
56. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403-04, 89
Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970); cf. Hurd, Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for
California Consumers, 25 HAsTNos L.L 1 (1973).
57. E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw § 1, at 3 (2d ed. 1957).
58. See id., R. KEETON, BASIC TExT ON INSURANCE LAW § 6.3, at 350 (1971).
59. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. Rv. 198,
222 (1920). See note 57 supra.
60. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Downey, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 876, 899, 216 P.2d 882, 896 (1950). See also Stark v. Pioneer Cas. CO.,
139 Cal. App. 577, 580, 34 P.2d 731, 732 (1934).
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in nature.61 Because of this quasi-public nature of the insurance busi-
ness, combined with the adhesion character of the dealing between the
parties, courts look to the reasonable expectations of the public and
the type of service the insurer holds itself out as offering.62  As stated
by Justice Tobriner in Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co., "[tlhe reasonable expectation of both the public and the
insured is that the insurer will duly perform its basic commitment: to
provide insurance."63  When an insurance company fails to meet this
basic commitment, the law looks beyond the form of the contract. 64
If the insurer has not discharged its public duty in good faith,
as well as its duty to its insured, it is only reasonable that it compensate
its insured for the detriment caused by its breach. The insured relies
heavily upon the insurer's experience and vast knowledge to protect
him against loss of the particular property insured. The insured further
relies on the insurer to protect against other property losses which will
result if the insured's claims are not properly met, as well as to provide
the mental peace that such losses will not occur.65
The court therefore has a duty to define the limits of this contract
and impress on each party the duty he owes the other, as well as the
duty he owes the public. The insurer must be held to a different stand-
ard of conduct, commensurate with the public nature of its business
and the adhesion character of its contracts. 66
Legal
Under traditional contract law, damages for breach of a contract
are restricted to those contemplated at the time of the making of the
contract.67 If the contract is one to pay money only, statute dictates
that damages are restricted to the amount due under the contract plus
reasonable interest.68
Justice Peters, in a carefully reasoned dissent in Reichert v. Gen-
eral Insurance Co. of America, found that the economic damage and
financial loss caused by failure of the insurer to pay the insured was
61. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 668 n.5, 456
P.2d 674, 680-81 n.5, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112-13 n.5 (1969); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
62. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 669, 456 P.2d
674, 681-82, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 113-14 (1969).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal.
66. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403-04,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
67. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 1007, at 70 (1964); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970).
68. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3302 (West 1970).
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the very injury sought to be insured against.69 Justice Peters argued
that such loss was contemplated or should have been contemplated by
the insurer at the time of contracting and should be compensable as
damages for breach of contract.
7°
It is recognized that an insured desires to shield himself from the
emotional stress and strain that accompanies such economic loss, 7  but
damages for emotional stress are not normally recoverable in a contract
action.7 2  Compensation for such injuries has been given as contractual
damages, but only in the narrow situation of a contract which directly
concerns the emotional well-being of the contracting party.73 While
it may be argued that a contract of insurance is of such a nature, dam-
ages recovered for emotional distress caused by an insurer's failure to
perform have been given primarily on the theory of tort.
74
While a breach of contract may be so extreme as to allow an action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 75 the nature of that cause
of action is to protect an individual from an invasion of his emotional
tranquility, rather than protect the property lost by such a breach. 76
In an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the injured
party is compensated for the emotional injury and losses which flow
from that injury, not for the economic loss which caused the injury
initially. It may be argued that Justice Peters' rationale of foreseeable
damages combined with an action for intentional infliction of emotional
69. 68 Cal. 2d 822, 849, 442 P.2d 377, 393, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 337 (1968)
(Peters, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 849-54, 442 P.2d at 393-96, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 337-40. In the original
decision of the court the majority agreed with Justice Peters. 428 P.2d 860, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 724. On rehearing the court reversed itself on a completely different ground.
The court held that plaintiff's right of action arose in contract, passed to Ii trustee in
bankruptcy, and that the plaintiff had no right to assert such claim. 68 Cal. 2d 822,
830-34, 442 P.2d 377, 381-83, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325-27 (1968).
71. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 19 (1967).
72. REsTATEmN- OF CoNmAcTs § 341 (1932).
73. E.g., Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948) (egligent em-
balming of plaintiff's mother); Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal App. 3d 844,
88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970) (negligent bailment of heirlooms); Westervelt v- McCullough,
68 Cal. App. 198, 228 P. 734 (1924) (violation of agreement to provide( residence for
aged plaintiff).
74. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); Fletcher v. Western Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1970).
75. E.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970); see Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1972).
76. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 402, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 94 (1970).
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distress, in effect reaches the same result as in an action for breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
This argument fails, however, because to recover for intentional
infliction of mental distress the plaintiff must establish outrageous con-
duct on the part of the insurer.77 In other words, an insurer may use
rather subtle but effective economic coercion, which does not reach out-
rageous conduct, to force an insured to accept a lower settlement offer.
By so doing, an insuer may be liable for damages for breach of contract
but not for the emotional distress actually caused, which was one of
the consequences the insured had reasonably expected would not occur.
Under the Crisci-Gruenberg rationale of the insurer's duty of good faith
and fair dealing, all detriment caused by the insurer's breach of contract
can be handled in a single cause of action, 78 and the insured can be com-
pensated for all damage foreseen and actually caused by the insurer's
breach.
While an extension of more traditional contract law to include
emotional distress as compensable damages for breach of an insurance
contract may have achieved the same result, the Gruenberg court chose
instead to characterize the action as one in tort.79  By so doing, the
court recognized its duty to control bad faith action on the part of the
quasi-public insurers; to apply contract theory would have denied the
court its basic vehicle for chastising such action. By characterizing it
as a breach of an implied-in-law duty, the court can compensate for
all damages actually foreseen and caused, as well as punish the insured
with exemplary damages in the appropriate case. While such conduct
may subject an insurer to administrative sanction,80 the court, by impli-
cation, has made a clear mandate. Bad faith action on the part of
an insurer in attending the interests of its insured will not be tolerated.
Nature of the Duty
The nature of the duty owed by an insurer to its insured is based
upon the totality of the relationship. It is a duty of the highest consid-
eration of good faith on the part of the insurer when it considers a
claim of its insured or a third party claim against the insured. 8' It
has been pointed out that the duty to settle a claim by a third party
against the insured, under the Comunale-Crisci rationale, creates a fi-
77. Id. at 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
78. Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
79. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573-74, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
80. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 704, 790.02, 790.03, 790.05, 790.07 (West 1972).
81. Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969).
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duciary duty in the insurer 2 and at least one court has so held.88 Gru-
enberg does not change the nature of the insured-insurer relationship.
Whether attending to the claims of third persons or to the claims of
the insured, the insured must still rely upon the insurer's good faith
execution of its duty. The reliance is not only the result of the buyer's
social and economic disadvantage, but is also a dependence the insurer
actively solicits by its advertising. While an insurer must account to
its stockholders and not pay fraudulent and fictitious claims,8 4 it still
holds itself out as a risktaker for the benefit of the insured.8 5 It has
no right to set up informal company policies not to pay under certain
policy provisions,86 to create nonexisting defenses,8 7 or to infer nonex-
isting motives that an insured is over-insured and may have committed
arson. 8 It must then, when considering a claim of its insured, take
notice of its "special relationship"89 with its insured and attend that
claim with the highest degree of good faith. Within such characteriza-
tion must be included the notion that an insurer is held to a special
duty not only because of the nature of his relationship to the insured,
but also because of his relation to the public in general as a quasi-
public business rather than an ordinary business concerned only with
self-interest.
Indicators of a Breach
Several tests and indicators of a breach caused by failure to settle
have been set forth under the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 0
In Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., the court laundry-listed various criteria
82. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 582, 510 P.2d 1032, 1043,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 491 (1973) (Roth, J., dissenting).
83. American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G.A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th
Cir. 1949).
84. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER Busn wss ENERPISES §§ 231-42 (2d ed. 1970).
85. See generally E. PATTERSON, ESSENTiALS OF INSURAN CE LAw §§ 53-59 (2d
ed. 1957).
86. See Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102
Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).
87. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970).
88. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973).
89. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
90. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958); Davy v. Public Nat'1 Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387,
395, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492 (1960); Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652,
659, 320 P.2d 140, 146 (1958); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679,
689, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957).
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to be considered as factors in ascertaining whether an insurer has ful-
filled his duty of good faith settlement.9 Such lists are useful, but,
because of the nature of the action, cannot precisely indicate all
breaches of good faith and fair dealing. Good faith implies honesty
and full revelation,92 whereas fair dealing seems to convey a similar
meaning of just, equitable and even-handed dealings with the other
party.93 These concepts, however, must be construed and defined under
the facts of each case, and there is no inflexible rule which can be applied
under all circumstances. While in hindsight we can say that a particu-
lar action was or was not done in the spirit of bad faith, it is not prac-
tical or probable that a court will set down an ironclad rule in such
situations.
9 4
But tests and indicators are helpful and an aid may be provided
for courts, insureds and insurers by a 1972 amendment to the unfair
practices section of the California Insurance Code.9 5 Although the put-
91. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957). The factors listed were: "[T]he
strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability and damages; attempts
by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer
to properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the
insured; the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; failure of the
insurer to inform the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of financial risk to
which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; the fault of the insured
in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the
facts; and any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the part of the
insurer." Id. at 689, 319 P.2d at 75.
92. Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 574, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 23 (1961); Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 396, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 492 (1960).
93. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
94. Cf. Kenniff v. Caulfield, 140 Cal. 34, 73 P. 803 (1903).
95. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (1)-(13) (West Supp. 1973). The amendment
added the following as unfair claims settlement practices:
"(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts of insurance policy provisions re-
lating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation
and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof
of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insur-
ance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in ac-
tions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed
advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
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pose of this act is to regulate the business of insurance by defining
practices which constitute unfair methods of competition and prac-
tice,9" and is primarily in the interest of the public as a whole,97 these
newly-defined unfair claims practices may be used by courts and in-
sureds as indicators of failure of an insurer to measure up to its duty
of good faith and fair dealing. This list should not be considered
exhaustive. The guiding principle of the court should be the totality
of the relationship and the reasonable expectations of the public and
the insured.
Conclusion
The court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. expanded the
Comunale-Crisci rationale to include within the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing not only the bad faith failure to settle with a
third person, but also the insurer's duty not to withhold unreasonably
payments due an insured under the policy.98 In so doing, the court
manifested its dissatisfaction with the present state of the insured-in-
surer relationship and some basic principles of contract law which do
not square with the realities of that relationship. The court in viewing
the whole of the insured-insurer relation as a "special relationship""9
considered the economic and social positions of each party and consid-
ered this relationship as almost a fiduciary one. The court recognized
that one of the driving forces behind a buyer seeking insurance protection
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered with-
out notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent, or
broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insured or beneficiaries, upon request
by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling
them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitra-
tion.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant,
or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then requiring the
subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain
substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under one
portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under
other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in the
insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a claim or
for the offer of a compromise settlement."
96. Id. § 790.02 (West 1972).
97. See id. § 790.05 (West 1972).
98. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573-74, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
99. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403, 8
Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
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is the peace of mind and freedom from worry its acquisition will bring.
The court further realizes that a breach by an insurer of his contract
of insurance is a wrong not only to his insured but may also be a breach
of its public duty. When such an unreasonable breach occurs, the
court, within its power and in keeping with public policy, should con-
demn such action in the form of granting punitive damages to the plain-
tiff.
While the court could have based its decision on an extension of
Justice Peters' Reichert rationale of foreseeable damages for breach of
contract, the court instead, by a correct extension of Crisci, chose tort.
In so doing, it side-stepped any argument that an insurance contract
does not directly concern comfort, happiness and personal welfare of
an insured as well as the foreseeability issue. But the major thrust
of the Gruenberg holding is that such action on the part of insurers
will not be tolerated and a breach of an insurer's duty of good faith
and fair dealing will lead the imprudent insurer down the path of ex-
emplary damages. The court in Gruenberg will not "require attorneys,
litigants and judges to force square pegs into round holes."'100 The
court has required insurance companies to square with their public and
private obligations and to meet the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured.
William H. Gilardy, Jr.*
100. Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
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